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Politicians travel extensively abroad, for various reasons. One purpose of external visits is to 
improve bilateral economic relations. In this paper, I examine the effect of state visits on 
international trade. I use a large data set covering the travel activities of the heads of state of 
France, Germany and the United States between 1948 and 2003. My results indicate that state 
and official visits are indeed positively correlated with exports. A typical visit is associated 
with higher bilateral exports by about 8 to 10 percent, holding other things constant. 
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 I. Introduction 
Politicians travel extensively abroad. In 2003, United States president George W. Bush 
made seven international trips, visiting twenty-one countries. President Jacques Chirac of 
France travelled on average more than two times a month out of the country for a total of 
twenty-five visits. Moreover, international travel activity seems to have strongly increased 
over time. At an extreme, German president Heinrich Lübke paid no visit at all to foreign 
countries during his first five-year term in office (1949-1954); he made his first international 
appearance, after having been re-elected, only in 1956. More generally, the German foreign 
ministry reports for the period from 1964 to 1968 158 incoming visits and 127 outgoing visits 
by heads of state, prime ministers or foreign ministers; by 1984-88, both numbers had risen to 
397 (Auswärtiges Amt [1995]).
1
The purpose of international trips by heads of state varies enormously. While the 
general aim is to develop and enhance bilateral relations, the focus may be on political issues, 
human rights, environmental protection, cultural contacts, or other themes. A topic that often 
features most prominently during these talks, however, concerns economic relations. Topics 
to be discussed may range from global economic issues and closer economic cooperation to 
joint investment projects and trade disputes. Also, heads of state are often accompanied by a 
high-ranking delegation of business people and managers. On the occasion of state visits, 
contact offices and business representations are opened, treaties and contracts are signed, and 
major bilateral projects are officially handed over. 
In this paper, I examine the empirical relationship between foreign visits by politicians 
and international trade. It has long been known that political factors affect the pattern of trade. 
For instance, democratic institutions, similar foreign policies and membership in the same 
military alliance or international organization tend to benefit trade. Similarly, wars, military 
conflicts or other political disputes inhibit trade.
2 Most recently, Andrew Rose (2005) has 
argued that the presence of diplomatic representations, such as embassies and consulates, 
promotes exports. Here, I ask: do state visits promote exports? 
To analyze this issue, I use a large data set covering the travel activities of the heads of 
state of France, Germany and the United States between 1948 and 2003; I differentiate 
                                                 
1 Even leaders of politically isolated countries travel. The great leader of North Korea, Kim 
Jong Il, visited China and Russia in 2001, Russia in 2001, and again China in 2004 (see 
www.kcna.co.jp). El máximo líder Fidel Castro of Cuba travelled to Algeria, Malaysia, 
Venezuela and South Africa in 2001, Ecuador and Mexico in 2002, and Argentina and 
Mexico in 2003 (see www.ain.cubaweb.cu).   
2 James Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Tressa Tabares (1998) provide an excellent 
overview. 
  1between various types of visits. In my benchmark specification, I use a standard gravity 
model of trade to control for other determinants of bilateral trade. However, endogeneity may 
be a potential problem. Therefore, I have also performed a number of robustness checks, 
including the use of a differences-in-differences specification. 
I find that state and official visits have on average a positive effect on exports. A 
typical visit is associated with higher bilateral exports by about 8 to 10 percent, holding other 
things constant. This finding is statistically robust and economically reasonable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the role 
of state visits for bilateral relations, followed by a detailed description of the data on state 
visits. Estimation results are presented in section 4, and section 5 provides a brief conclusion. 
 
II. State Visits 
State visits are important. They are the highest form of diplomatic contact between 
two countries, and they often mark the further development in bilateral relations. In political 
circles, it is common to refer to these events on later occasions. 
State visits are also viewed as being effective. For instance, the office of the German 
president notes that: “Such visits make a valuable contribution to foreign relations, for 
although the Federal Republic of Germany is represented abroad by its embassies, it is often 
only through face-to-face talks between leaders that productive outcomes fair to both sides 
can be found. Whether the objective is coordinating policy, explaining German interests or 
resolving any bilateral problems that may arise from time to time, the kind of informal talks 
the Federal President has with foreign leaders during his trips abroad can be most helpful.”
3 
Similarly, the British government emphasizes: “Concerns about any matters, including 
observance of international law by the country concerned, may be raised during a state visit.”
4
Finally, state visits take place only relatively rarely. Part of the explanation is that such 
visits are time-consuming and expensive; they are characterized by major ceremonial and 
diplomatic protocol and formality.
5 For instance, in the United Kingdom, where the Queen 
acts as host, the royal protocol describes a state visit as follows: “Each visit lasts from a 
Tuesday to a Friday, and the visiting Head of State stays either at Buckingham Palace, 
Windsor Castle or, occasionally, The Palace of Holyroodhouse in Edinburgh. During the visit, 
the Head of State will meet the Prime Minister, government ministers, leaders of the political 




5 The costs of the visit are usually borne by the host country. 
  2parties, as well as meeting the heads of diplomatic missions in London, and leaders of 
commerce and industry. The Head of State will attend a State Banquet in his or her honour, 
and host a banquet in turn. One day is spent by the visiting Head of State outside London or 
Edinburgh, visiting places or organisations of interest to the visitor so that they can see 
various aspects of British life.” Given this immense amount of preparations, it is not 
surprising that the British Queen usually hosts only two incoming state visits each year.
6
The overwhelming majority of foreign travels by politicians, then, are other visits than 
state visits. Trips can still have official character; others may be working visits, trips with 
semi-official character, or private visits.
7 While all of these visits could be, in principle, 
associated with economic issues, some visits are clearly unrelated to the economy (such as 
attendance at ceremonies). Therefore, in analyzing the relationship between travels and trade, 
it is important to control for the actual purpose of a visit. I now describe the data on state 
visits in more detail. 
 
III. Data 
My basic sample consists of all official external visits by the heads of state of France, 
Germany and the United States for the period from 1948 through 2003.
8 In all three countries, 
the formal head of state is the president. For Germany, however, I use the trips of the 
chancellor (Bundeskanzler) instead of the president (Bundespräsident) since the latter has no 
executive power and his foreign travels have mostly representative character. French data is 
only available from 1959 onwards. 
                                                 
6 http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/Page376.asp 
7 The British government notes on the difference between state visits, official visits, working 
visits and private visits: “Private visits and working visits take place at the initiative of the 
visitor. The arrangements are usually made by their London embassy or high commission. 
Programmes for working visits, as the name suggests, normally contain a working element, 
often a meeting with a senior government Minister. Private visits do not. State visits take 
place at the personal invitation of The Queen. The arrangements are made by Buckingham 
Palace, with support from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the relevant London 
embassy or high commission. […] Heads of state can also visit this country as guests of Her 
Majesty's Government. Arrangements for guest of government visits are made by the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. Programmes normally include a number of working elements, 
including meetings with government Ministers, and government-hosted hospitality.” See 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldhansrd/vo020703/text/20703w01.htm 
8 It should be noted that, in 2003, these countries were the #1 (Germany), #2 (the U.S.), and 
#5 (France) leading exporter in the world, making up 25 percent of world merchandise 
exports. 
  3Table 1: Visits by heads of state 
 
 









      
1948-49  – 0 0 0 
1950-59  3
1 39
2 23 65 
1960-69  50 51 61  162 
1970-79  83 91 65  239 
1980-89  171  114 61 346 
1990-99  180 149 144 473 
2000-03  71 93 64  228 























      
1948-49  – 0 0 0 
1950-59  3
1 12
2 2 17 
1960-69  36 25 16 77 
1970-79  43 41 31  115 
1980-89  87 46 24  157 
1990-99  87 71 16  174 
2000-03  29  59 1 89 




1 Data for 1959 only. 
2 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also served as (his own) minister of foreign affairs from 1951-1955. 
3 Many bilateral visits of U.S. presidents are officially classified as working visits. 
 
  4In total, my data set comprises 1513 official travels. For all these travels, I have 
compiled the date, the destination and the main purpose of the trip. The upper part of table 1 
provides a breakdown of travels by (home) country, period, and main destination. As noted 
before, travel activity has considerably increased over time. Also, European leaders tend to 
travel more often; this is not surprising given smaller country size and their higher degree of 
international cooperation and integration. 
Data on travels are obtained from a number of different sources. Foreign travels by 
U.S. presidents are recorded by the Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State; 
the data are available online at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/trvl. Detailed information on 
travels by French presidents is kindly provided by the archives and documentations 
department of the French presidency; additional information is obtained from the Musée du 
président Jacques Chirac. Finally, a listing of official travels by German chancellors, 
aggregated by chancellor and destination, is available from Auswärtiges Amt (1995); data 
from 1994 onwards is provided by the German foreign ministry directly. Based on these 
listings, the exact dates and the main purpose of the trips are identified, using information 
from Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart.
9
In most cases, the above sources also provide information on the status of a visit. 
Typically, a trip’s status as a state visit or as a working visit (sometimes referred to as 
bilateral consultations) is clearly identified. All other visits are then classified by hand into 
two groups, based on the main purpose of the visit: official visits and other visits. 
Since all of the visits in my sample are, by definition, official, the main classification 
strategy for visits not explicitly labeled a state or a working visit is to identify reasons for 
travel other than bilateral talks. These reasons may include, among other things, attendance at 
multilateral talks and summits (such as G-7/G-8 meetings), visits to international 
organizations (such as the United Nations), attendance at ceremonies (such as official 
openings, anniversaries or state funerals), and informal visits (such as visits to military 
personnel and stop-overs). If none of these reasons is identifiable, travels are classified as 
official visits. In sum, I distinguish between four types of visits: state visits, official visits, 
working visits, and other visits. 
In the empirical analysis, I will mainly focus on a pooled variable of state and official 
visits. While there may be little observable difference between a state visit and an official visit 
anyway (apart perhaps from protocol and formality), this procedure also helps to avoid some 
                                                 
9 I thank Evan M. Duncan for some clarifying information, and Emmanuelle Flament-
Guelfucci, Anne-Sylvie Chemille, and Barbara Wiegel for the provision of data. 
  5potential difficulties. For instance, there may have been ambiguities in the classification of a 
visit as a state visit. Further, in France, state visit status (visite d’etat) was unknown before 
president Francois Mitterrand took office; major trips by French presidents were previously 
labeled visite officiel or voyage officiel. Finally, in Germany, only the president (not the 
chancellor) officially pays state visits (though some of the chancellor’s trips are occasionally 
labeled a state visit in the press). As a robustness check, however, I examine whether state 
visits have a separate effect on exports. 
 
IV. Results from a Gravity Approach 
As my baseline econometric specification, I apply a gravity model of trade to examine 
the association between travels and exports. The gravity model, which essentially links the 
bilateral value of trade between two countries to their economic size and the distance between 
them, has been recently used extensively in the literature. It has an excellent empirical fit and 
also has robust theoretical foundations; see, for instance, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
In particular, I estimate variants of the following equation: 
 
(1) Expijt = α + β1 Distij + β2 GDPitGDPjt + Σk=3 βk Xijkt + γ Visitijt + δt + εijt
 
where Expij denotes the log of exports from country i to j at time t in current U.S. dollars; Dist 
and GDP are the standard gravity regressors: the log of great-circle distance between 
geographic centers and the gross domestic product in current U.S. dollars, respectively; X is a 
set of other control variables that are typically found to affect the bilateral pattern of trade, 
including per capita incomes, sharing a common land border, sharing a common language, 
membership in the same free trade arrangement, current and former colonial links, and 
sharing a common currency; Visitijt is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the head of state of country i has paid an official visit to country j at time t; δt is a full set of 
year-specific fixed effects; and εijt is a stochastic error. 
The coefficient γ on the visits dummy is the parameter of interest to me; it captures the 
extent to which the value of exports to countries which have been recently visited by heads of 
state differ from the average value in the sample, after holding constant for other determinants 
of trade.  
  6The data are mainly taken from standard sources. Exports (f.o.b.) come from the 
Direction of Trade Statistics CD-ROM compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
10 
GDP and population are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators; the 
series are extended to the period before 1960 with data from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. Distances are calculated based on geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) 
taken from the CIA’s World Factbook. For all other variables, I have used the classification 
from Rose (2004).
11
Benchmark results are reported in table 2. The first column of the table reports 
standard pooled OLS estimates for a conventional gravity specification. Throughout, standard 
errors have been adjusted for clustering across country pairs, and period-specific intercepts 
are always included. As shown, the gravity framework works well in explaining the trade 
pattern of the three exporting nations. Trade values tend to fall with distance and increase 
with the economic size (as measured by the countries’ GDP) of the pair. Also, a common 
language, colonial links, and a common currency encourage trade, while landlockedness 
reduces trade. In total, the model explains remarkably large 86 percent of the variation in 
bilateral trade flows. 
The next column adds the variable of interest. Are state and official visits by French 
and U.S. presidents and German chancellors associated with higher exports to a particular 
country? The answer is: yes. The estimated γ coefficient is positive, statistically highly 
significant (with a t-statistic of 2.9) and economically reasonable. The magnitude of the 
coefficient of about 0.13 indicates that a typical official visit is associated with larger bilateral 
exports by about 14 percent (=exp[0.129]-1), holding other things constant.  
                                                 
10 I follow conventional practice and ignore entries of zero (or unrecorded) trade. However, 
this problem is of only minor relevance anyway, since for most bilateral pairs in my sample, 
positive trade values are reported. 
11 The World Factbook is available online at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. Andrew 
Rose generously makes available his data sets at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm. 















Period  1948-2003 1948-2003 1948-2003 1948-2003 1948-2003 
       
State and official 
visits 






















































   0.488** 
(0.090) 














  -1.021** 
(0.080) 




  -0.147 
(0.097) 
















   1.112** 
(0.147) 










       
R-squared  0.86 0.86 0.76 0.76 0.76 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of exports. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # 
denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year effects included in all 
regressions but unreported. Exporting nations are the United States, France (post-1958), and Germany. 
Number of observations = 18,409. 
  8In the other three columns of table 2, I report the results from three different 
estimators. First, I include a comprehensive set of exporter and importer fixed effects. Then, I 
allow for country-pair specific fixed intercepts, and finally I also allow for country-pair 
specific random effects. To the extent that unobservable (or otherwise omitted) variables 
affect the pattern of trade, these estimators should provide a more consistent estimate of γ 
since all time-invariant factors are automatically taken into account.
12 Therefore, these 
estimators seem generally better suited for the panel structure of the data (though I have no 
particular preference for one of these estimators). 
The panel estimators leave the key finding of a robust positive association between 
visits and exports basically unaffected. The estimated γ coefficient is always positive and 
significant, though the point estimate is marginally lower. The estimates indicate that state 
and official visits are on average associated with higher exports by about 8 (=exp[0.076]-1) to 
10 percent (=exp[0.094]-1) which is similar in magnitude to Rose’s (2005) results for the 
effect of embassies on exports.  
Next, I explore the time pattern of the linkage between visits and exports. In particular, 
I re-run the regression, but this time I add a comprehensive set of dummy variables for the 
five years before and after a state or official visit has taken place; that is, I estimate separate 
γ’s for Visitijt-5, Visitijt-4,…, Visitijt+5. Figure 1 provides a graph of the coefficients, with the 
vertical line marking the year in which a visit occurs. For convenience (and also for 
comparison with the results in table 2), the figure plots four sets of estimates corresponding to 
the four different estimation techniques that I have used before; coefficients that are 
statistically different from zero are marked.  
Interestingly, for all four estimation techniques, the γ’s are already positive and 
significant in the pre-visit period, indicating that exports to a country tend to be 
disproportionately large already before a visit to this country has taken place. While this may 
imply that simultaneous causality affects the results, an issue to which I will return in more 
detail below, it is encouraging to note that this effect is partly cured by the fixed effects 
estimators. When fixed effects are included, the pre-visit γ’s are lower (than those computed 
from pooled least-squares) and, for periods of more than two years before a visit, also 
indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, it may be not too surprising to see exports increase in 
                                                 
12 This also includes observable time-invariant factors which are included in the regression 
such as landlockedness in the case of country-specific fixed effects or distance in the case of 
country-pair specific fixed effects. 
  9the run-up to a visit. Some visits are, for instance, clearly related to the finishing and official 
handing-over of large (bilateral) investment projects. 
Most importantly, however, state visits appear to have an independent, measurable 
effect on exports. The γ parameter increases sizably in the year a visit takes place and 
increases further in the following two years (thereby in total almost doubling in magnitude), 
before the effect gradually begins to fade. In sum, exports are substantially higher in the post-
visit period than before. 
I have also performed a number of other robustness checks. Table 3 examines the 
sensitivity of the results to different types of visits. In the first row, I reproduce for 
convenience the baseline estimates for state and official visits. I then test explicitly for the 
effect of state visits on trade – without much success; the coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero at any conventional level of significance and actually takes a consistently 
negative sign. Results seem to be stronger for working visits, with γ being mostly positive and 
significant, while other visits than state, official or working visits display no statistically 
identifiable association with exports. I consider these results as generally plausible and 
reassuring. 
In table 4, I replace the log of exports with the log of imports as regressand. The 
statistical association between visits and imports appears to be weaker than for exports; the 
estimates of γ are smaller in magnitude and often lose statistical significance. Thus, although 
visits by politicians (and accompanying trade delegations) may generally indicate good 
bilateral economic relationships, they tend to promote exports rather than imports. Again, it is 
comforting to note that the results confirm intuition.  
Tables 5 and 6 provide some further sensitivity analysis. Table 5 splits the sample over 
time and reports separate estimates for (roughly) 20-year-intervals; table 6 presents estimates 
for individual exporters. A general observation from these tables is that γ is estimated with 
less precision for individual sub-samples; this is not terribly surprising when the number of 
observations is reduced. However, there are also two other notable results. First, the 
association between visits and exports appears to be particularly strong for the period from 
1971 to 1990 and may generally have increased over time. While there is no evidence 
whatsoever of an association between visits and exports before 1970, γ becomes consistently 
positive and significant for the 1970s and 1980s. Results are then less clear for the most recent 
years. While the point estimate from the pooled OLS further increases in magnitude, the γ 
coefficients obtained from panel estimators become indistinguishable from zero again. 
  10 
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Notes: Lines show coefficient estimates for different estimation techniques. Lines with squares, 
crosses, triangles and circles indicate pooled OLS, exporter and importer FE, pair-wise FE and pair-
wise RE, respectively. Squares, crosses, triangles and circles mark coefficients that are statistically 
robust at the 5% level. 
 












      










      











































Notes: Dependent variable is the log of exports. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # 
denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Same controls used (but 


















      





















































Notes: Dependent variable is the log of imports. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # 
denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Same controls used (but 
unreported) as in table 2. Year effects always included but unreported. Number of observations = 
17,990. 
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Notes: Dependent variable is the log of exports. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # 
denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Same controls used (but 



















      








      

























Notes: Dependent variable is the log of exports. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and # 
denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Same controls used (but 




  13Table 7: Results by head of state 
 








U.S. Presidents         
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German Chancellors         
























































R-squared  0.86 0.56 0.76 0.85 
Notes: See notes to table 2.  
  14Second, travels by German chancellors seem to have by far the largest effect on 
exports. For the other two exporters in my sample, the state visits variable performs poorly.
13  
Table 7 pools the data again, but allows for politician-specific effects of visits on 
exports. Not surprisingly, the head-specific γ’s vary considerably. There is substantial 
heterogeneity across individual politicians; results also differ for different estimators. For 
some politicians, however, estimates turn out to be remarkably robust, though I intend to take 
the precise point estimates not too literally. For instance, travels by president Charles de 
Gaulle und chancellor Konrad Adenauer are negatively correlated with exports. On the other 
hand, visits by president Jimmy Carter, chancellor Helmut Kohl and, most strongly, 
chancellor Gerhard Schröder are accompanied by substantially higher exports.
14  
 
V. Results from a Differences-in-Differences Specification 
A potentially serious problem is simultaneous causality. State visits may promote 
exports, but the choice of destinations for state visits may also be affected by a destination’s 
importance as an export market. To the extent that invitations for visits are accepted based on 
export potential, the estimate of γ would be upwardly biased. 
To deal with this issue, I apply a long-run differences-in-differences specification.
15 In 
particular, I regress the annual growth rates of bilateral exports (Expgrowthijt) on a dummy 
variable (EverVisitij) that takes the value of one when a country has ever received an official 
visit from the exporting nation in my sample (and thus is a member of the treatment group) 
and a dummy (Visitijt) that is equal to one when an actual visit (i.e., treatment) has taken 
                                                 
13 Instead of slicing the sample, I have also experimented with allowing the visits effect to 
vary over time and estimating exporter-specific effects in pooled regressions. These 
regressions, however, produced essentially similar results. 
14 There is also anecdotal evidence, supporting the view that the effect of visits may vary 
across heads of state. Edzard Reuter, former CEO of Daimler-Benz, notes: “In 1978, 
chancellor Schmidt invited me to accompany him to Tokyo and Singapore. In contrast to 
current practice, where the number of so-called “special guests” on those state visits has 
increased by a multiple, there were three business colleagues and a representative from the 
unions on board the air force Boeing 707. […] It was completely different to accompany 
chancellor Kohl; I travelled with him and his delegation to the People’s Republic of China, to 
Beijing and Canton, in 1983. By then, it was part of the usual decorum of such a visit to give 
the impression to the public that the chancellor in person has helped German companies to 
win orders worth billions.” (Berliner Zeitung, January 31, 1998). 
15 An alternative approach to establish causality is IV estimation. I have been unable, 
however, to identify useful instruments for state visits. Rose (2005) uses variables of a 
country’s geo-political importance and its attractiveness for tourists as instruments for the 
presence of diplomatic missions. 
  15place. As before, I also include a comprehensive set of time dummies (δt) so that I estimate an 
equation of the form: 
 
(2) Expgrowthijt = α + β EverVisitij + γ Visitijt + δt + εijt
 
This specification has a number of advantageous features. First, the focus on growth 
rates deals with all time-invariant factors that affect the level of bilateral exports; these factors 
simply cancel out, thereby taking account of any particularly large and intense bilateral trade 
relationship. Using growth rates instead of levels also deals with the problem of serial 
correlation in differences-in-differences regressions as emphasized by Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan (2004). Second, the EverVisitij dummy controls for any systematic difference in 
growth in exports between countries which have received a visit (the treatment group) and 
countries which are not visited (the control group). To the extent that politicians travel to 
destinations to which their country exhibits particularly strong growth in exports, this dummy 
should capture this effect. Third, the time dummies control for any period-specific shocks and 
common trends in exports growth. Finally, other regression controls can be easily added to 
this model.  
I first estimate equation (2) without additional controls by conventional pooled least 
squares. Table 8 presents the results. In the first column, I tabulate estimates when the 
treatment period is restricted to the year in which the visit actually takes place. The β 
coefficient, which identifies the treatment group of countries which have ever received a visit, 
is positive and significant; that is, there is indeed a measurable difference in bilateral exports 
growth between countries which receive visits and places on earth that remain unvisited. But 
also the γ coefficient is positive and significant, implying a substantial additional increase in 
exports growth to these countries at the time a visit actually occurs. In fact, the magnitude of 
the effect of visits on exports is almost twice as large as the long-run difference in exports 
growth between the treatment group and the control group. 
In the other columns of table 8, I report estimates when the treatment period is 
gradually extended over time. The results show strong evidence of a positive, but short-lived 
effect of state visits on exports. Rising marginally in magnitude for the year immediately 
following a visit, the estimate of γ tends to get smaller for longer periods and eventually 
becomes insignificant. For periods of more than two years after a visit, a difference in exports 
growth rates is no longer measurable at a reasonable level of significance. 
  16 
 
Table 8: Differences-in-Differences Results 
 
 
 Pooled  OLS 












Visit (year 0)   0.028** 
(0.010) 
     
After 0-1 year     0.029** 
(0.008) 
    
After 0-2 yrs      0.021** 
(0.006) 
   
After 0-3 yrs       0.011# 
(0.006) 
  
After 0-4 yrs        0.009# 
(0.005) 
 
After 0-5 yrs         0.003 
(0.005) 
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
        
        
  Exporter & importer fixed effects 












Visit (year 0)   0.022* 
(0.010) 
     
After 
0-1 year 
   0.024** 
(0.008) 
    
After 
0-2 yrs 
    0.015* 
(0.007) 
   
After 
0-3 yrs 










     -0.002 
(0.005) 
R-squared  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual growth rate of bilateral exports. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. **, * and # denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year 
effects always included but unreported. Visits generally refer to state and official visits. Number of 
observations = 22,590. 
 
  17In the lower half of the table, I present analogous estimates when exporter and 
importer fixed effects are added. While the β coefficient on the treatment group variable is 
insignificant in this specification (the treatment group identifier is a country-pair fixed effect), 
the key results remain essentially unaffected. Shortly after a state visit, exports grow strongly, 
an effect that loses significance after more than two years. 
In another extension, I differentiate between the first visit to a country and repeated 
visits.
16 The first visit by a head of state to a particular country is typically strongly 
emphasized in political circles as well as in the press. Still, it may require frequent visits to 
achieve measurable outcomes. Therefore, to identify a possible non-linearity in the effect of 
visits on exports, I split the Visits variable into two separate variables, one for the first visit to 
a particular country (in my sample of almost 60 years) and another one for all other trips that 
(may) have followed to this destination. 
Table 9 contains the results. The estimates reveal a striking difference in the effect of 
initial and repeated visits on exports growth. In fact, the estimated effect of state visits on 
exports seems to result purely from repeated visits. A first visit, in contrast, affects exports 
growth only in the first year (if anything) and is then often followed by a decline in exports in 
subsequent years. 
While the differences-in-differences specification clearly shows that exports increase 
after a visit, one might still argue that politicians mainly choose travelling to destinations with 
large market potential; that is, politicians may tend to visit countries with generally strong 
import demand, so that the γ coefficient would simply reflect strong increases in a country’s 
imports (from potentially many suppliers) at the time a foreign official travels the country. To 
explore this hypothesis, I include an additional dummy variable to the specification, labeled 
ReceivedVisit, that takes the value of one whenever a country receives a visit (from one of the 
three exporters in my sample). The γ coefficient then captures the visitors’ country exports 
growth to the travel destination (at the time a visit takes place) not only relative to other 
periods (as before) but also relative to other exporters. 
                                                 
16 I also experimented, without much success, with adding year-specific regressors such as 
GDP growth. 
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 Pooled  OLS 





















     
First Visit  
(after 0-1 year) 
   0.031 
(0.021) 
    
Repeated Visit 
(after 0-1 year) 
   0.029** 
(0.008) 
    
First Visit 
(after 0-2 yrs) 
    0.018 
(0.015) 
   
Repeated Visit 
(after 0-2 yrs) 
    0.022** 
(0.007) 
   
First Visit 
(after 0-3 yrs) 




(after 0-3 yrs) 




(after 0-4 yrs) 




(after 0-4 yrs) 




(after 0-5 yrs) 
     -0.012 
(0.010) 
Repeated Visit 
(after 0-5 yrs) 
       0.008 
(0.005) 
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
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Table 9 (continued): First visit vs. multiple visits 
 
 
  Exporter & importer fixed effects 





















     
First Visit 
(after 0-1 year) 
   0.018 
(0.021) 
    
Repeated Visit 
(after 0-1 year) 
   0.025** 
(0.009) 
    
First Visit 
(after 0-2 yrs) 
    0.006 
(0.016) 
   
Repeated Visit 
(after 0-2 yrs) 
    0.018* 
(0.007) 
   
First Visit 
(after 0-3 yrs) 




(after 0-3 yrs) 




(after 0-4 yrs) 




(after 0-4 yrs) 




(after 0-5 yrs) 
     -0.023* 
(0.011) 
Repeated Visit 
(after 0-5 yrs) 
       0.005 
(0.005) 
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual growth rate of bilateral exports. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. **, * and # denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year 
effects always included but unreported. Visits generally refer to state and official visits. Number of 
observations = 22,590. 
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 Basic  sample 
  Pooled OLS  Exporter & importer 
fixed effects 












Visit (year 0)   0.019 
(0.014) 





   0.020* 
(0.010) 





    0.019* 
(0.008) 










(after 0-1 year) 
   0.011 
(0.008) 




(after 0-2 yrs) 
    0.003 
(0.007) 
    0.004 
(0.008) 
Observations  22,590 22,590 22,590 22,590 22,590 22,590 
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
        
        
  Add rest of the world as exporter 
  Pooled OLS  Exporter & importer 
fixed effects 












Visit (year 0)   0.013 
(0.012) 





   0.014 
(0.009) 





    0.011 
(0.007) 










(after 0-1 year) 
   0.015* 
(0.006) 




(after 0-2 yrs) 
    0.009# 
(0.005) 
    0.008 
(0.006) 
Observations  31,286 31,286 31,286 31,286 31,286 31,286 
R-squared  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual growth rate of bilateral exports. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. **, * and # denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year 
effects always included but unreported. Visits generally refer to state and official visits. 
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of other countries tend to be higher; the coefficient on the additional control variable is 
consistently positive, although not statistically different from zero. A potential explanation for 
this finding is that heads of state often pay visits to a similar set of countries within a few 
years. Also, a visit may indicate improved conditions of doing business with the host country. 
Still, the country that pays the visit exports significantly more than other countries in the 
sample.  
In another robustness check, I extend the sample and include the rest of the world as 
an (aggregate) exporter, in addition to France, Germany and the United States. Perhaps other 
countries report also strong export growth to destinations that receive visits from French or 
U.S. presidents or German chancellors. Since I lack information on travels of other heads of 
state, however, and I also ignore other determinants of trade growth, I consider this a very 
strong test. As shown in the lower part of table 10, estimation results are generally weaker 
with this specification, and the γ coefficient even loses statistical significance. However, the 
coefficient remains strongly positive and is only marginally reduced in magnitude so that the 
effect of a visit on exports remains economically important. The estimated coefficients imply 
that exports growth of a visiting country is almost twice as large as that of other countries 
(which may or may not have paid a visit). 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Politicians travel extensively abroad, for various reasons. One purpose of external 
visits is to improve bilateral economic relations. In fact, an often stated objective is to 
promote a country’s exports. In this paper, I examine whether state visits have indeed a 
measurable effect on international trade.  
Based on a large data set that covers the travel activities of the heads of state of 
France, Germany and the United States for the period from 1948 to 2003, I find that state and 
official visits are indeed positively correlated with exports. I first apply a gravity model of 
trade to control for other trade determinants and find that a visit is typically associated with 
higher exports by about 8 to 10 percent. My results are sensitive to the type of visit (as they 
should), and are much less robust for imports. 
I then use a differences-in-differences specification to deal with the issue of reverse 
causality. The results show a strong, but short-lived effect of visits on bilateral exports 
growth, which is driven by repeated visits to a country. 
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